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The Broadband Stimulus:
A Rural Boondoggle and Missed Opportunity
GREGORY L. RosSTON & ScoTT J. WALLSTEN*
Abstract: The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
included $7 billion for broadband development. We highlight
two endemic problems with the rural subsidy programs
managed by the National Telecommunications Agency
("NTIA"): 1) There is little economic rationale for subsidizing
rural areas; and 2) NTIA's mechanism for selecting projects
appears to have been largely incoherent. The rationale for
rural subsidies has been debunked by scores of economists -
the programs turn out to be inefficient income transfer
mechanisms and do not tend to increase subscriptions, but
Congress forced NTIA to award subsidies. In its awards,
NTIA adopted a system that led to awards differing by more
than a factor of loo in terms of expected cost-effectiveness.
Had it adopted a more reasonable framework, many more
households could have been connected for the same money,
or the same number of connections could have been realized
for a fraction of the cost.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2009, Congress passed the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act ("ARRA" or "Recovery Act").' Among the goals of
* Rosston is the Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy
Research and a co-Chair of the Department of Commerce Spectrum Management Advisory
Committee. The views in the paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the CSMAC.
Wallsten is a Senior Fellow at the Technology Policy Institute. The authors would like to
thank Corwin Rhyan for excellent research assistance.
1 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Stimulus Bill) Pub.L. 111-5, Feb. 17,
2009, 123 Stat. 115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 6, 19, 26, 42, and 47
U.S.C.).
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the Recovery Act was short-term stimulus: "(1) To preserve and create
jobs and promote economic recovery; (2) To assist those most
impacted by the recession." 2 The ARRA also had long-term goals of
investment in infrastructure: "(3) To provide investments needed to
increase economic efficiency by spurring technological advances in
science and health. (4) To invest in transportation, environmental
protection, and other infrastructure that will provide long-term
economic benefits."3
The Recovery Act included $7 billion for broadband development:
$2.5 billion through the Rural Utilities Service ("RUS") and $4.7
billion for the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program
("BTOP") administered by the National Telecommunications
Information Agency ("NTIA"). These broadband programs more
easily fit within the second set of goals given their long lead time for
construction, although both agencies also made efforts to award
grants in a rapid manner to provide short-term stimulus.
The law prohibited applicants from receiving money from both the
RUS and the BTOP programs: "Provided further, that no area of a
project funded with amounts made available under this paragraph
[Rural Utilities Service] may receive funding to provide broadband
service under the Broadband Technology Opportunities Program."'
RUS was to provide loans and grants subject to a provision stating,
"That priority for awarding funds made available under this paragraph
shall be given to projects that provide service to the highest
proportion of rural residents that do not have access to broadband
service."6 NTIA, however, had no such clear mandate regarding how to
award funds.
In this paper, we focus on three problems with the rural subsidy
programs managed by NTIA. First, there is little economic rationale
for subsidizing rural areas. Second, even recognizing that political
realities might trump economic rationale and cause the political desire
to subsidize rural areas, NTIA's mechanism for selecting projects
appears to have been largely incoherent. Third, the short-term
infrastructure grants and loans could well lead to pressure for long-
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 id.
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term operating subsidies from the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC").
NTIA has come under scrutiny recently for providing funding for
areas that already have broadband.' It is important for NTIA to
prevent fraud, but the costs of massive inefficiencies in the BTOP
program itself almost certainly outweighed losses resulting from
fraud.
We assembled a dataset of all of the BTOP grants made by NTIA
and found an extremely wide range in the expected cost effectiveness
of the grants.! Some grantees received more than 30 times as much
support as other grantees per mile of fiber deployed, and oo times as
much per new projected broadband connection. While some
heterogeneity in cost effectiveness is to be expected, it is not clear that
funding some of the least cost-effective projects was a good idea when
NTIA likely rejected other, more cost-effective, projects, or could
simply have determined that those projects would not pass any
reasonable cost-benefit test.9
II. WHY RURAL SUBSIDIES ARE INEFFICIENT
Despite the long history of subsidies for rural areas, especially for
telephone service, there is no economic justification for these
programs. Rural subsidies take money from urban customers and give
them to rural residents and companies serving rural residents when
such companies have market power. Rosston and Wimmer (2000)
show that only a small fraction of money designated to provide service
7See Andy Vuong, Taxpayer-Funded EAGLE-Net Broadband Network May Need More
Money, THE DENVER POST, (Feb. 28, 2013, 1:oo AM),
http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_22683746/taxpayer-funded-eagle-net-
broadband-network-may-need; Edward Wyatt, Waste Is Seen in Program to Give Internet
Access to Rural U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/12/technology/waste-is-seen-in-program-to-give-
internet-access-to-rural-us.html?pagewanted=all&_r=o (noting that some believe
EagleNet is overbuilding areas that have service from telephone companies, cable
companies, or both).
8 We attempted to secure data from NTIA on the rejected applications, but NTIA does not
make such information readily available.
9 If NTIA made the information available, we could readily assess the assertion about the
relative costs of accepted and rejected applications.
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in rural areas goes to low income rural residents.'o With very low
elasticity of demand for telephone service, rural telephone subsidies
are inefficient income transfer programs, and they do not generally
make transfers to low-income households.
It would be nice to have every household in the country connected
to wired broadband service, but connecting households and providing
monthly service in the most rural areas is costly, and resources are
limited. So, tradeoffs are important. The FCC's National Broadband
Plan estimated that it would cost $24 billion to connect all households
in the country." It also estimated that connecting the last 250,000
homes would cost $14 billion (of the $24 billion), or $56,ooo per
household.12 The implicit message in that document was clear-should
that much money be spent on connecting a few homes?
From an economic perspective, subsidy money for rural areas
ultimately results in either a transfer to rural landowners or rural
service providers. If residents value the improved broadband brought
by the subsidies or if the subsidies reduced prices, then landowners
could charge higher rent for their land without losing tenants (and
they would also have a higher implicit rent if they lived on their own
land reflecting the increased value of their property because of the
subsidized service). As a result, the subsidy may have reduced the
nominal price of the broadband service, but not the cost of living in
the rural area and subscribing to broadband.
Despite the overwhelming economic evidence about the
inefficiency of rural subsidy programs, Congress forced NTIA and
RUS to perpetuate the harm to the economy by requiring subsidies for
rural build-out rather than relying on market demand, especially for a
service that is "critical" implying a low, and possibly decreasing,
elasticity of demand.13 "The purposes of the program are to-(1)
10 Gregory Rosston & Bradley Wimmer, The "State" of Universal Service, 12 INFO. ECON. &
POL'Y. 3, 261-283 (2000).
n FCC, Connecting America: The National Broadband Plan, 136 (Mar. 17, 2010), available
at http://www.broadband.gov/download-plan.
12 Id. at 150.
13 See ROBERT CRANDALL & LEONARD WAVERMAN, WHO PAYS FOR UNIVERSAL SERVICE?:
WHEN TELEPHONE SUBSIDIES BECOME TRANSPARENT, BROOKINGS (Brookings Institution
2000); Ross C. Eriksson, David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Targeted and Untargeted
Subsidy Schemes: Evidence from Postdivestiture Efforts to Promote Universal Telephone
Service, 41 J.L. & ECON., 477 (1998); David L. Kaserman and John W. Mayo, "The Quest for
Universal Telephone Service: The Misfortunes of a Misshapen Policy," in
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY: HAVE REGULATORS DIALED THE WRONG NUMBER? (Donald
L. Alexander ed, 1997) (Kaserman and Mayo provide a nice history of the universal service
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provide access to broadband service to consumers residing in
unserved areas of the United States; (2) provide improved access to
broadband service to consumers residing in underserved areas of the
United States; (3) provide broadband education, awareness, training,
access, equipment, and support...."
A. Constrained Optimization
Given a congressional dictate to implement a rural broadband
project, NTIA and RUS were forced to operate in a second best world.
In a Joint Request for Information ("RFI"), NTIA and RUS asked how
they should award a large amount of stimulus money in a way that
satisfies the requirements of the Recovery Act.
Grant Mechanics: The Recovery Act requires all
agencies to distribute funds efficiently and fund
projects that would not receive investment otherwise.
a. What mechanisms for distributing stimulus funds
should be used by NTIA and USDA in addition to
traditional grant and loan programs?
b. How would these mechanisms address
shortcomings, if any, in traditional grant or loan
mechanisms in the context of the Recovery Act?"
Procurement awards are notoriously difficult to evaluate because
supply offers can differ on a large number of dimensions, such as
quality, timing, and coverage, to name a few. As a result, many
contracts are awarded arbitrarily with a large degree of subjective
program); Michael H. Riordan "Universal Residential Telephone Service," in HANDBOOK OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS 423 (Martin E. Cave, Sumit K. Majumdar, Ingo
Vogelsang eds., Vol. 1 2002); Gregory Rosston & Bradley Wimmer, The State'of Universal
Service, 12 INFO. ECON. AND POLICY 261 (2000); Scott Wallsten, The Universal Service
Fund: What Do High-Cost Subsidies Subsidize?, Technology Policy Institute, (2011),
available at http://www.techpolicyinstitute.org/files/wallsten%
2ouniversalservice_moneyjtrail.final.pdf.
14 ARIA of 2009, supra note 1, at 398.
15 Notice of Request for Extension of a Currently Approved Information Collection, 74 Fed.
Reg. 47, 10716 (Mar. 12, 2009), available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/frbtop-rfi.o90312.pdf.
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evaluation and unclear tradeoffs between different attributes.
However, certain selection mechanisms can increase the efficiency of
grant awards.
In response to the NTIA/RUS RFI, a group of seventy-one
economists (including the authors of this Article) submitted
comments in an effort to provide an efficient framework for
disbursing the broadband stimulus money." In that filing, we
discussed the time, costs, and inefficiency of the traditional
government procurement process. We also noted that the traditional
process has difficulty comparing different types of projects in a
coherent way. For example, one company might propose connecting
homes via fiber whereas another might propose covering the same
homes with wireless. How should the agencies choose which project to
fund? Finally, the traditional grant selection process has no real ability
to get firms to bid the minimum amount truly necessary to provide
service. To overcome these problems, we proposed an auction process
to create an objective framework that could be implemented rapidly,
allow for cross-technolo comparisons, and minimize the amount
spent to provide service. To run this auction, NTIA would first define
the geographic areas eligible for subsidies and the broadband
objective it wishes to achieve in those areas. Then, firms and other
eligible entities could bid for the subsidy necessary to make that
service profitable.
While an auction process would remove some flexibility from the
decision process, it would have required NTIA to come up with
objective measures to compare grants, thereby speeding the process
and allow explicit tradeoffs between different characteristics. For
example, NTIA could have given more weight to fiber optic
infrastructure than to slower wireless proposals. Such rules would
force NTIA to make explicit any cost tradeoff - for example, fiber
might have a weighting of 1.5 compared to wireless so that a fiber
project could still be chosen even if it were up to 50 percent more
costly than the wireless project. Determining the "correct" tradeoff
would not have been easy, but failing to address the issue upfront
would not eliminate the problem. Without making tradeoffs explicit,
NTIA would simply have to make those tradeoffs in an opaque and ad-
hoc manner.
16 Paul Milgrom et al., Comments of 71 Concerned Economists: Using Procurement
Auctions to Allocate Broadband Stimulus Grants (2009),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstract-id=1377523.
17Id.
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One thorny issue for rural universal service is that often only a
single entity is willing to serve an area." As a result, it is hard to get
truthful revelation of the firm's costs, and to get the firm to act
efficiently with prevalent subsidies. Because BTOP grants were a one-
time event and were available across the country, they presented a
great opportunity to see how auctions could be used to create
competition across areas to serve as competitive discipline and
encourage firms to reveal their true willingness to serve.
Under the FCC's Universal Service Program Connect America
Fund (originally called the High Cost Fund), eligible firms generally
receive subsidies based on estimated costs regardless of anyone else's
estimated costs. Our proposal for BTOP competitive bidding would
base support on the cost (as measured by its bid for subsidy) of the
marginal supplier and use competition to increase efficiency. So, for
example, even though only a single entity might be willing to serve a
rural area in Texas, that firm would have to compete with firms that
were willing to provide service in rural North Carolina and rural
Montana. As a result, that firm would place a bid reflecting its cost
since the auction design would reward it based on the marginal firm's
cost, and all firms with lower costs would have their projects selected
and no firms with higher costs would be funded.
If the goal of the program is to connect as many otherwise
unconnected people as possible, then grants should be awarded on the
basis of cost-effectiveness. If the relevant measure were, say, dollars
per household, then areas with the lowest cost per household would
receive the subsidy. The location of the grant, therefore, should not
matter to the decision. A grant that would connect rural North
Carolinians for $1oo per person should be funded before a grant that
would connect a rural Texan for $700 per person. In other words, the
government should use its money to offer connections to the most
people, and if it can pass seven times as many people in North
Carolina for the same amount of money as it would spend for people
in Texas, it should do so.
B. The FCC's Mobility Auction
The FCC recently demonstrated that the type of auction we
proposed is feasible. Wallsten (2013) provides an extensive analysis of
18 Entrants are often deterred even from places that could otherwise support competition
because of the presence of a subsidized competitor.
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the FCC's recent "mobility auction."l9 In that auction, the FCC had
companies bid to provide wireless coverage. The bids were ranked
according to their cost per road mile. While road miles may not have
been the best metric, it was announced in advance and companies
from different geographic areas competed against each other for the
limited ($300 million) subsidy money. Figure 1 below shows the areas
that received bids in the auction. The areas in black, where the graph
is fairly flat, were awarded subsidy grants. The areas in gray, where
the graph increases substantially, were not awarded subsidies because
they were more expensive, in some cases much more expensive, than
the winning areas.
Figre i
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The graph above tells part of the story-that there were some very
high bids that were not accepted, allowing the mobility fund to cover
more areas. In addition, the table below shows that in areas that had
multiple bidders, the low cost bidders were substantially more cost
effective than their direct competitors. In these areas alone, the
'9 Scott Wallsten, Two Cheers for the FCC's Mobility Fund Reverse Auction, ii J.
TELECOMM. AND HIGH TECH. L. (forthcoming 2013).
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efficiency increase was substantial. In addition, the savings indicate
that competition across areas was also efficiency enhancing.
Table 1:
Bids and Total Subsidy Requested by Winning and Losing Bidders in
Areas that Received Two Bids
Average $/Road Mile Total Subsidy Requested
Winning Bidders $2,291 $14.2 million
Losing Bidders $7,631 $47.3 million
One issue with the structure of the auction is that each bidder was
given the face value of its bid. A "pay as bid" auction does not
engender truthful revelation among bidders. Many of the bidders on
the far left of the graph could have submitted a much higher bid per
mile and still received a subsidy. In future auctions, bidders may see
this result and adjust their bids upwards. This could be problematic
especially if the bidders expect the FCC to continue funding higher
and higher cost areas for mobility.
BTOP, however, was a one-shot opportunity, meaning that a
simple pay-as-bid auction could have had less downside than it would
in a repeated game. The "Revenue Equivalence Theorem" holds that
under those circumstances it should not matter whether there is a pay
as bid or an all pay auction. The problem with an all pay auction,
where each bidder would get the same payment per mile, is that there
might be substantial negative publicity at paying more than bidders
requested.2 0
III. THE NITA BTOP GRANTS
NTIA did not use an auction or any other systematic mechanism
for comparing proposals across geographies or technologies. As
expected, it turned out that the NTIA process took fourteen months
for the first set of grants and nineteen months for subsequent grants
from the signing of ARRA.21 It is not completely clear why NTIA
20 See Evan R. Kwerel & Gregory L. Rosston, An Insiders' View ofFCC Spectrum Auctions,
17 J. REG. ECON. 253, 289 (2000) (discussing the perception issues in early spectrum
auctions that led in part to the FCC's choice of a simultaneous multiple round ascending
auction).
21 Program Reports, NITA.DOC.Gov, http://WWW2.ntia.doc.gov /BTOP-Reports#evaluation.
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rejected using a more systematic and objective approach, although it
is likely that retaining tight control over where money flowed made it
easier for the agency to keep politicians in Congress with oversight
authority happy. 2
A. Selection Criteria
To be funded, a proposal must advance at least one of five
"statutory purposes" 23 and fit into one of the three categories of
grants: Sustainable Broadband Adoption (SBA); Public Computing
Centers (PCC); and Broadband Infrastructure grants.24 Beyond
meeting a "statutory purpose," the grant applications were subject to
numerous eligibility factors and evaluation criteria.
To pass the first round of the selection process, a grant was
required to show that all its grant funding would go towards eligible
expenses (some expenses such as general operating expenses or
expenses prior to the application date were not eligible), that a twenty
percent funding match was provided by non-federal sources or a
waiver for this requirement was met, evidence that the project would
not be completed "but for" federal funding, and that an application
was completed fully and on time. Beyond the first round of the
process, multiple and varying criteria were used in evaluating grants,
however, the evaluation generally focused on projects' benefits (what
level and amount of services would be provided to the public),
projects' viability (the technical and organizational feasibility), and
sustainability (the likelihood services would continue beyond the life
22 See Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative
Procedures as Instruments ofPolitical Control, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987).
23 See 47 USCA § 1305 (2013) (Explaining the purposes of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 20o9 as (1) providing broadband service to consumers in unserved
areas; (2) providing improved broadband service to consumers in underserved areas; (3)
providing broadband access, education, awareness, training, equipment, and support to
community anchor institutions, vulnerable populations, or job-creating facilities in
economic development areas; providing broadband service for the purpose of public safety;
and (4) stimulating the demand for broadband, economic growth, and job creation).
24 Notice of Funds Availability, Broadband Technology Opportunities Program &
Broadband Initiative Program, 74 Fed. Reg. 130 (July 9, 20o9), available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ ntia/publications/frbbnofa o907o9.pdf.
25 Id.
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of the grant).2 6 Additional factors considered in the grant process
included how quickly the money could be spent ("shovel readiness" in
the vernacular of the ARRA era), how the grant might promote
broadband for public services such as education and healthcare, the
extent to which the grant would collaborate with other stimulus
projects in the ARRA, and if the entity requesting the grant qualified
as a "socially and economically disadvantaged small business."
Logistically, this selection was to proceed in three stages. First,
NTIA would conduct an initial screening of applications to determine
whether the simple completion requirements were met. Applications
that passed the initial NTIA screen would be reviewed by at least three
independent reviewers (more on this below) defined as "peers or
expert reviewers who have demonstrated subject matter expertise."
Using a numerical-based evaluation, these reviewers would score each
project application on its purpose, benefits, viability, sustainability,
and other factors. Also, during the second stage, state governments
were given an opportunity to rank the eligible projects in their
geographic areas based on their own criteria.2 8
After the second stage review, the passing applications were asked
for more detailed materials if needed by NTIA and evaluated on "Due
Diligence" by NTIA personnel. The last step of the evaluation process
was a final evaluation and grant acceptance by the Director of BTOP
and the Office of Telecommunications and Information Applications
("OTIA") based on recommendations of the 3-personnel evaluation,
the Due Diligence review, the priority ranking of the states, the
geographic and technological types of the grants, and the budgetary
limits of the BTOP program.2 9
It is unclear how NTIA actually chose which projects to fund. The
"panel of experts" used to evaluate each grant was not a group of
highly-informed, paid grant evaluators, but instead was a selection of
26 Slides from Round 1 Public Workshops on the application process, NTIA, July 7-24,
2009, at slides 12-14, available at
http://WWW2.ntia.doc.gov/documents/NTIABTOPo721.pdf.
27 Id. at slides 7-11, 13.
28 One of the authors, Rosston, was asked to serve as an "expert" reviewer by the State of
California. After looking at the scope of the projects, room for subjective scoring, his own
lack of expertise in evaluating such projects, and the arbitrariness of the process, he
declined to participate in the evaluation process.
29 Notice of Funds Availability, Broadband Technology Opportunities Program &
Broadband Initiative Program, 74 Fed. Reg. 130 (July 9, 2009), available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ frbbnofao90709.pdf.
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volunteers who were accepted on a "first-come, first-served" basis.30
The only qualifications needed to apply for a volunteer position were
expertise or experience in one of the following areas: (1) the design,
funding, construction, and operation of broadband networks or public
computing centers; (2) broadband-related outreach, training, or
education; (3) innovative programs to increase the demand for
broadband services. 3 1 Volunteers also had to agree to comply with the
Department Commerce rules for conflict of interest and
confidentiality.3 2
In addition, there is some doubt about the extent to the
completion of the pre-evaluations performed by NTIA given reports
such as the following from the State of California:
Originally, the federal departments of agriculture and
commerce were going to determine which applications
were viable and then forward them to the state for
ranking, but last week federal officials said the state
would have to do an initial review on its own, said Joe
Camicia, chief of staff in the Office of the State Chief
Information Officer.33
The second round of BTOP funding, which began in 2010 and
allocated the remaining dollars of BTOP funds to eligible projects, had
minor changes in the selection process which included reduced initial
eligibility requirements, fewer panel experts for each grant, and
30 The initial press release asking for volunteers has been removed from the NTIA
broadbandusa.com website; however, copies of this request can be found at
http://www.freedomtechnologiesinc.com/ntiawatch/?p=450;
http://www.tagtech.org/news/2896o/Call-for-Reviewers-Broadband-Technology-
Opportunities-Program-BTOP-.htm; see also Esme Vos, NTA Seeks Volunteers to
Evaluate Broadband Grant Applications, MUNIWIRELESS,COM, (July 8, 2009),
http://www.muniwireless.com/2009/o7/o8/ntia-seeks-volunteers-for-grant-applications.
31 Esme Vos, NTIA Seeks Volunteers to Evaluate Broadband Grant Applications,
MUNIWIRELEss (July 8, 2009), available at
http://www.muniwireless.com/2009/o7/o8/ntia-seeks-volunteers-for-grant-applications.
32 Id.
33 See Patrick Hoge, State Ranks Broadband Stimulus Bid, SAN FRANCISCO BusINEss TIMES
(Sept. 20, 2009, 9:oo PM), available at
http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/stories/2009/o9/21/storylo.html?page=all.
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increased importance for grants with matching funds greater than 30
percent of project cost.34
NTIA did not make any clear, ex ante scoring rules and
competition amongst grants, nor did it set out any objective metrics
for how it would compare grants. There likely were some objective,
quantitative scores for different segments of the grant evaluation.
However, none were made explicit in advance of the application
process, nor were the results of the scores made public. As a result, it
is impossible to provide a comprehensive and sstematic evaluation of
NTIA's implementation of the BTOP program.
B. High-Level Evaluation
We have put together a data set of NTIA applications and awards.
Infrastructure grants account for nearly ninety percent of the dollars
awarded ($3.5 billion of a total of $3.9 billion) so our analysis focuses
on that segment of NTIA grants. NTIA received 6oo applications for
over $13 billion of support for infrastructure, an average of $22
million per project. It ended up awarding $3.5 billion for 123 projects,
an average of $28 million per project. Of course, each project is
unique so simply comparing the average cost per project provides
little information about the cost effectiveness of the projects. Table 2
below shows the applications for grants.
34 Notice of Funds Availability, Broadband Technology Opportunities Program &
Broadband Initiative Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 14, (Jan. 22, 2010), available at http://
www2.ntia.doc.gov/rules#nofa2.
35 We note that NTIA has contracted for an evaluation of some selected grants by an
outside firm, ASR Analytics, LLC (see
http://www2.ntia.doc.gov/files/fbo-award-notice_dlopdl8645_2nd-posting.pdf).
However, the projects were selected by NTIA rather than based on a systematic random
sample or clear criteria. As a result, we are skeptical that such an evaluation will provide
objective information or a reasonable basis for program evaluation.
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Table 2:
NTIA Grant Applications and Awards (in millions)36
$'s Applied For $'s Awarded Awarded Ratio
Infrastructure $13,319 $3,483 26.2%
Middle Mile Broadband $2,455 - -
Middle Mile Fiber $4,804 $2,883 60.0%
Middle Mile Wireless $1,037 $156 15.1%
Last Mile Broadband $1,049 - -
Last Mile Fiber $389 $27 7.1%
Last Mile Wireless $1,908 $32 1.7%
Public Safety $1,674 $382 22.8%
Public Computing Centers $2,809 $199 7.1%
Sustainable Broadband Adoption $3,768 $250 6.7%
Total $19,897 $ 3,933 19.8%
As shown in F, "Middle Mile Fiber" projects were the bulk of
infrastructure projects, accounting for eighty-three percent of the
infrastructure projects and over seventy percent of all projects funded.
With NTIA information on awarded projects, we calculated the simple
average projected cost per mile for each Middle Mile Fiber and Middle
Mile Wireless project. The cost projections and mileage estimates
come from NTIA and were part of the grant applications, so were, we
assume, considered when awarding grants. Figure 2 shows the
infrastructure projects that included expected miles covered, arranged
from most cost-effective to least cost-effective.
36 See Grants Awarded, NTIA.DOC.GOV, http://www2.ntia.doc.gov/awards (last visited
Sept. 6, 2013); Search Applications, NTIA.DOC.GOV,
http://ssl.ntia.doc.gov/broadbandgrants/applications/search.cfm (last visited Sept. 6,
2013).
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Figure 2
BTOP Infrastructure Projects: Estimated Total Project Cost Per Mile
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The low cost project is "Bridging the Digital Divide for Iowa's
Communities" with a cost of $8,149 per new and upgraded existing
mile of fiber. In contrast, the high cost project is "Ute Indian Tribe of
the Uintah and Ouray Reservation Fiber Optic Infrastructure Project"
with a cost of $256,378 per mile. Fourteen awarded Middle Mile Fiber
projects had a projected cost of over $ioo,ooo per mile. While the Ute
project only cost $2 million in total, the "Digital 395 Middle Mile
Project" was awarded more than $80 million from BTOP, cost over
$1oo million in total, for a cost per mile of $183,ooo. The data imply
that BTOP spent about $65 million for the most cost-effective 10,000
miles of fiber and close to $820 million for the least cost-effective
1o,ooo miles.
For Middle Mile Wireless, which may be a substitute for fiber, the
low cost project, the "Central North Idaho Regional Broadband
Network Expansion" had a cost of about $4,000 per mile, while the
high cost project, "Five County Broadband Interconnected Training
Access" cost more than $22,000 per mile. However, even the high end
of the wireless cost was much lower than many of the fiber projects.
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Figure 3 shows the expected cost per mile for the Middle Mile
Wireless Projects.37
Figure 3
BTOP Middle Mile Wireless Projects: Estimated
Total Project Cost Per Mile
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While accounting for much less of the money, such large ranges
also appear in the broadband adoption grants (Figure 4).
37 Note, the Middle Mile Wireless projects did not include total projected miles in the
public grant applications; therefore, we approximated the total cost per mile from the total
dollars spent and total miles deployed as of September, 2012.
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Figure 4
BTOP Sustainable Broadband Adoption:
Projected Cost per New Subscriber
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The "Connecting Alabama: Boosting Broadband to Bridge the
Digital Divide" project cost just under $2 million and was projected to
connect over 50,000 new subscribers at a cost of about $30 per
connection. The "Freedom Rings: Sustainable Broadband Adoption"
project cost $17.4 million to connect a projected 5,050 new
subscribers, for a cost per connection of $3,451, a factor of more than
1oo times the low end.
These data do not prove that BTOP ignored more cost-effective
proposals or that it did not fund the best proposals along some
metrics. Truly evaluating NTIA's evaluation mechanism requires
information about rejected applications. Unfortunately, NTIA does
not make this information available publicly, and quoted us a price of
$144,715.09 for the data based on a Freedom of Information Act
request we submitted. Without this data it will be impossible for
anyone to determine whether BTOP money was spent as effectively as
possible, but it would be surprising if some rejected applications did
not have lower costs on these metrics. With some projects coming in
at extremely high costs, it is important to think about a reasonable
cost-benefit analysis for the expenditure of public money. NTIA
should make the data available in an easy to access fashion so that it
can learn about more efficient ways to spend grant money.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Recovery Act authorized a huge expenditure of public money,
in some cases for questionable value. The BTOP program
administered by NTIA and RUS falls into the category of money
poorly spent. First, there is no economic justification for rural service
subsidies, especially for a service that is inelastically demanded and
when more efficient ways to target subsidies to low-income
households exist. Second, NTIA failed to set up a systematic scoring
system to pick the most cost-effective projects. As a result, the
available evidence points to a very inefficient outcome - many high
cost projects were funded that likely should not have been funded. To
make a complete evaluation, NTIA needs to make data available
publicly and not simply rely on an outside firm evaluating NTIA's
hand-picked projects.
